Following Kaplan (1989a,b) , one normally is prompted to maintain that the context relevant to yield an indexical sentence a specific truth-conditional content is a certain context of its utterance, whose basic parameters are: the speaker or agent, 1 the time, the place and the world of the context. For our purposes, this is tantamount to saying that that specific truth-conditional content is possessed by a pair made by that indexical sentence plus a certain context, a context of utterance of that very sentence.
2 That sentence-context pair can be moreover taken as formally representing an utterance of that sentence.
3 So, take: Yet, as is well known at least from Vision (1985) , there are apparent counterexamples to the thesis that the context paired to an indexical sentence in order for the resulting sentence-context pair to have a certain truth-conditional content is the same as a context of utterance for that sentence. If today at 2 p.m. I register a message on my answering machine saying: in order to tell my wife that I won't be home at 5 p.m., when she will hear the message (as well as that I want her to meet me at 7 p.m. at the cafeteria), I am not telling a logical falsehood, i.e., something which is false in every context. 5 Yet this is what I would say if the context relevant to truth-conditionally interpret (2) were the context of its utterance, whose time parameter is precisely 2 p.m. For in such a case what I would say would be true in that context iff the utterer were not in the place of the utterance at the time of the utterance itself. This content rather makes the sentence obviously false in such a way, that that sentence would express a falsity in any other context in which it were uttered.
In order to cope with this and similar other cases, Predelli (1998a,b) proposes to tell contexts of utterance from contexts of interpretation. Generally speaking, contexts of interpretation are those yielding an indexical sentence a specific truth-conditional content, in the afore-mentioned sense that each pair made by that sentence and one such context has that specific truth-conditional content. Normally, contexts of interpretation coincide with the contexts of utterance of the same sentence, as in (1). Yet in some other cases, e.g., cases like (2), they do not so coincide. In such cases, the parameters that constitute them are to be intentionally fixed; that is, either the agent or the time or the place or the world of the interpretation context is an intended parameter, distinct from the corresponding parameter of the utterance context. For instance, in the case of (2), the context relevant in order to give (2) a specific truth-conditional content (in the above sense) is a context of interpretation differing from the corresponding context of utterance. For its time parameter is not the utterance time (2 p.m.), but an intended time, i.e., 5 p.m., namely the time at which the speaker thinks his wife will hear the message. This context of interpretation is an improper context, for the agent of the context is not in the place of the context at the time of the context itself.
Predelli's solution of the answering machine case and similar ones has some advantages on some other treatments of the same cases. For one thing, it is semantically economical in that it does not multiply characters, as Smith (1989) does. Take other non-ordinary cases of indexical sentences showing use of historical present, like the following example by Corazza (2004a, 291) :
Now Hitler begins his invasion of USSR.
In it, "now" is clearly used not to refer to the time in which (3) is uttered, a certain day of 2004, but rather to the time of Hitler's starting the invasion of USSR, namely, June 22, 1941. Smith would say that in passing from an ordinary indexical sentence to (3), the indexical "now" shifts its linguistic meaning, or Kaplanian character. For it passes from working as a pure indexical having the time of the context as its character, to linguistically mean the same as the complex demonstrative "this time". 6 On the contrary, Predelli would solve the same case by appealing not to a character, but to a context, shift. Unlike (1), the context relevant for yielding (3) a specific truth-conditional interpretation is not the context of its utterance, but an intended context whose time is the time intended by the speaker, i.e., June 22, 1941 . Put alternatively, the sentencecontext pair which has that truth-conditional interpretation contains that intended context. Yet once that context shift has occurred, the reference of the relevant indexical -"now" in such a case -is still fixed by the very same indexical's character; in that context, "now"'s only Kaplanian character makes it refer to June 22, 1941. 7 In this respect, Predelli's solution of the above cases is semantically more economical than Smith's solution. 8, 9 Yet it remains that there must be a criterion to settle when the interpretation context is not the utterance context. Predelli is convinced that he has found that criterion by appealing to the speaker's intentions. Both in the case of (2) and in the case of (3), "now" does not refer to the utterance time but to another time, for the speaker has so intended (and intends his interlocutor to recognize this intention). 10 Yet pace Predelli speaker's intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine a certain interpretation context, as we will immediately see.
Intentions are not necessary. When an English translator of an infamous speech addressed by the 2004 Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi to the German deputy Schutz utters: (4) I would recruit you as a kapò in one of my tv serials of course the indexical "I" in that utterance of (4) refers not to the English translator, but to Berlusconi himself. This is completely independent of the translator's intentions: even if the translator does not intend to be speaking on Berlusconi's behalf, the fact that she is working as a translator makes her speak on his behalf. As a result, it is true that the context relevant for yielding (4) a specific truthconditional interpretation shifts from the context of utterance to another context, which has Berlusconi rather than his translator as the agent parameter. 11 Yet this context shift occurs completely independently of the speaker's intentions. 12 Moreover, intentions are not sufficient either. Even if Berlusconi thinks to be Napoleon, if he utters:
(5) I ruled the French Empire "I" does not refer to Napoleon (in order to say something true), but it still refers to Berlusconi himself (in order to say something false), Berlusconi's intentions notwithstanding. So, the context relevant to yield (5) a specific truth-conditional content (in the sense that the pair made by that sentence and that context has that truthconditional content) has Berlusconi and not Napoleon as its agent parameter.
To be sure, Predelli may reply that this example is not a good candidate for a context shift. For the way in which the speaker uses a pure indexical like "I" in (5) does not override its reference; hence, it does not enable the interpretation context for that indexical to shift from its utterance context to an improper context. 13 Yet we may well consider another, standard, example to the same purpose. Is it possible to save Predelli's perspective from the above criticisms, that is, to retain the distinction between utterance contexts and interpretation contexts by finding another criterion to draw that distinction, namely, to enable us to settle when an interpretation context is not an utterance context? To my mind, this question can be answered affirmatively. To put it in a nutshell, I think that one has to switch from an intentionalist to a fictionalist perspective. Following Recanati (2000) , I take it that whenever the context relevant for the semantic interpretation of an indexical sentence is not its proper context of utterance, that context is not an intentional context, but a fictional context, i.e., a context which has at least one fictional parameter: a pretended agent, or a pretended space, or a pretended time, or a pretended world. . . . That is, a pretense involving some context parameter has to occur, in order for the interpretation context to shift from the utterance to another, improper, context. In Recanati's own words, the context-shift is [. . .] a form of pretense. (2000, 232) one cannot change the context at will. The only thing one can do is to pretend that the context is different from what it is. (2000, 257) First of all, let me remark that, by here appealing to pretense, I am not appealing to the speaker's intentions of deceiving her interlocutors, as when someone pretends to be asleep in order not to be disturbed by people standing close to her. Rather, I am appealing to the practice of playing make-believe games. A child, or an actor, pretending in a make-believe game e.g. to be someone else, does not want to deceive her audience about her identity. For that audience takes for granted that within that game she is someone else. In actual fact, she would not play such a game if she were not recognized by that audience as so playing.
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In this new light, let us reconsider the previous examples. As I said before, in order for (4) to receive a specific truth-conditional content, (4) has not to be evaluated in the context of its utterance, but in a different context in which Berlusconi, not his translator, is the agent. Put alternatively, the pair made by (4) and that context has precisely that truth-conditional content. Let us continue to call this context an interpretation context, as Predelli does. Yet this context is not an intentional, but rather a fictional, context. This context arises from the fact that, utterly independently of her possible intention to refer to Berlusconi, the speaker of (4), i.e., the translator, plays a certain make-believe game with her utterance of that sentence. In directly translating someone else's speech, the speaker plays a certain game in which it is make-believedly the case that she is that someone, namely, Berlusconi. In this respect, in fact, working as a translator is no different than working as an actor. In lending her voice to the character she is representing on stage, an actor make-believedly is that character. Analogously with a translator, who lends her voice of fluent speaker in a certain language to the person she is translating by speaking on her behalf. 16 So, Berlusconi is the pretended agent of that utterance, or, which comes to the same thing, is the agent of a context different from the context of that utterance, i.e., a given fictional context which has Berlusconi among its parameters precisely as the agent parameter. An analogous explanation has to be given for (6): in (6), "I" refers to the office owner and not to its utterer insofar as its utterer pretends to be the office owner, that is, she engages herself in a makebelieve game in which she plays the office owner's part.
The answering machine case is a case of the same type. The speaker of (2) is playing a make-believe game in which he is pretending to be not at the time in which he is speaking -2 p.m. -but rather at another time, the time in which he expects his wife to hear the message, i.e., 5 p.m. Thus, 5 p.m. is the pretended time of that utterance of (2), or, which comes to the same thing, is the time of a context different from the context of that utterance, i.e., a given fictional context which has 5 p.m. among its parameters precisely as the time parameter. 17, 18 The mechanism in play both in the case of (2) and in the case of (4) (or of (6) for that matters) is thus the same. As much as one can imaginatively detach from the time 19 in which she presently is, one can also imaginatively detach from herself. Although she remains the utterer of (4) (or of (6)) -she does not behave as the mere output of the locutionary act of someone else -the personal pronoun she utters does not refer to herself, but to the individual she makebelievedly is.
So, the examples Predelli interpreted in terms of the intentionalist theory can be reconsidered in terms of the fictionalist theory. This holds generally for all the remaining cases presented by Predelli. See for example instances of free indirect discourse like the following example by Recanati (2000, 229) :
After a while, she gave her response. Tomorrow, she would meet me with pleasure; but she was too busy now.
In this example, the temporal indexicals "now" and "tomorrow" do not refer respectively to the day of the utterance and to the day following it, but rather to the day of the reported response and to the day following that day. This is allowed by the fact that the speaker pretends that the day (following the day of) of the utterance be the day (following the day of) of the reported response.
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True enough, speaking of fictional contexts with respect to all the above cases may leave one perplexed, for all such cases are not normally conceived of as involving fiction. What is fictional e.g. in one's hanging (6) on someone else's door?
Granted, talking here of "fictional contexts" may seem to stretch the meaning of that locution. Yet it seems to me that this extension is well-founded. For the contextual shift affecting the above cases is precisely of the same type as that affecting paradigmatic cases of fiction. As many have maintained, 21 in the latter cases the sentence involved is semantically affected by a shift from the real context of its utterance to a fictional context. That is, in those cases the relevant sentence passes from being truth-conditionally interpreted in the real context of its utterance to be truth-conditionally interpreted in a fictional context. Now, what in those paradigmatic cases makes the context fictional is the fact that its world parameter is shifted to an imaginary world. Indeed, the world of the utterance is pretended to be another world. Yet note that the fact that in those cases the world parameter is shifted to an imaginary world makes the relevant context only paradigmatically fictional. Put alternatively, in order for a context to be fictional, it is sufficient that make-believe affects any other context parameter. In point of fact, the previous cases of shift from an utterance context to a fictional context are simply cases in which, although the world parameter remains fixed to the real world, one of the other contextual parameters is accordingly modified by make-believe.
Although the world shift takes place with respect to any sentence paradigmatically involving fiction, this shift can even more clearly be seen if the relevant sentence contains an indexical for the world. Suppose that chapter 4 of Joyce's Ulysses began with the following indexical sentence:
Mr. Leopold Bloom actually ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls.
In such a case, in writing (8) Joyce would have played the same kind of make-believe game which he effectively played in writing its deindexicalized counterpart, namely, the same sentence without "actually": i.e., a game in which he pretended that the world were an imaginary world populated also by imaginary individuals like Leopold Bloom. Thus, that imaginary world is the pretended world of (8)'s utterance, or, which comes to the same thing, is the world of a context different from the context of that utterance, i.e., a given fictional context which has that imaginary world among its parameters precisely as its world parameter. In (8), "actually" simply makes this context shift vivid, for it precisely refers to that world and not to the real world, as it would on the contrary be the case if the interpretation context to be paired to (8) for truth-conditional purposes were its ordinary context of utterance. Put alternatively, both (8) and its de-indexicalized counterpart receive a specific truth-conditional interpretation in the same fictional interpretation context; while the de-indexicalized counterpart is true in such a context iff the imaginary individual Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls, (8) is true in the same context iff in the imaginary world of that context the imaginary individual Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls.
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So, paradigmatic cases of fiction are different from the above cases (2)- (4) and (6)- (7) simply insofar as in them the shifting parameter in the interpretation context is the world parameter. As a consequence of this kind of shift, unlike the above cases, the sentences involved in paradigmatic cases of fiction primarily receive fictional rather than real truth-conditions. On the one hand, the sentences (2)- (4) and (6)- (7) are said to be really true, i.e., true in the respective fictional interpretation contexts whose world parameter is the real world, iff things respectively belonging to those contexts behave in a certain way. On the other hand, take again (8) and its deindexicalization. These sentences are said to be fictionally true, i.e. true in a certain fictional interpretation context whose world parameter is an imaginary world, iff things belonging to that context behave in a certain way. More precisely, (8)'s de-indexicalization is fictionally true, i.e., true in a certain fictional context whose world parameter is shifted to an imaginary world, iff, in that imaginary world, Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls; (8) is fictionally true iff, in the very same imaginary world, Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls in that imaginary world. On the other hand, e.g. (2) is really true, i.e., true in a certain fictional context whose mere time parameter is shifted, iff, in the real world which is the world of that fictional context of interpretation, the speaker (the husband) is not home at 5 p.m. (of the relevant day). So, by appealing to pretense we have found a criterion to tell interpretation from utterance context, or in other words, to settle where the interpretation context is not an utterance context. That is, the above examples show that wherever context shift occurs, a form of pretense is involved: context shifts because at least one parameter of the utterance context is pretended to be a different one.
Yet, as Corazza, Fish and Gorvett (CFG from now onwards) have remarked in (2002), one might object that switching from intensionalism to fictionalism fares no better. For again, fiction is neither necessary nor sufficient for fixing a contextual shift. In this vein, against fictionalism CFG raise the following putative counterexamples. 25 According to CFG, pretense is not necessary. For suppose Ben posts a note on Joe's door saying: (9) I think the Chancellor is a fool.
Even though Joe has no intention at all to insult the Chancellor (and therefore is quite likely upset for the fact that such a note has been posted on his door), in the above token of (9) "I" shifts its reference from Ben to him. To be sure, Ben may have pretended to speak on behalf of Joe. Yet, CFG remark, that act of pretense is not responsible for the referent of "I" to be Joe. For Ben's interlocutors might well have ignored that Ben were so pretending, yet they would have taken the relevant token of "I" as referring to Joe, pretty much as they actually do. Precisely as they would have taken the personal pronoun "me" as referring to Joe again, if they had seen a post-it on his shoulders saying:
(10) Kick me even if Joe had not been personally responsible for such a message (unbeknownst to him, someone attached that message on his shoulders).
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Moreover, for CFG pretense is not sufficient either. Suppose a teacher utters: (11) I am tired.
Even if his students take him as playing the part of being Aristotle, hence as pretending to be the Greek philosopher, no contextual shift occurs. "I" continues to be interpreted in the context of its utterance, as therefore referring to the teacher.
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CFG do not limit themselves to criticize the fictionalist position, however. They also offer a positive solution to the question of why, in cases like (6) (as well as (9) and (10)), the personal pronoun "I" shifts its reference from its utterer to a different agent. In this respect, CFG appeal to conventions instead of pretense. That is, they say that whenever such a shift occurs, a conventional setting must have been established. For instance, we have a convention according to which a post-it hung on someone's office door like (6) has to be interpreted, with respect to its "I"-token, as talking not about its utterer, but about the owner of that office, in case the first individual were not identical with the second. They also note that the same kind of convention prevents a post-it like (6) from being interpreted, with respect to its (implicit) token of "here", as talking about an office dustbin, if that post-it should accidentally fall there. In such a case, in fact, nobody would think that the office's owner is not through the rubbish in the dustbin.
In reply to conventionalists, I urge that the fictionalist position can both cope with their objection and incorporate their positive remark. To begin with, conventionalists appear to misunderstand what the fictionalist means by "pretense". They indeed seem to take pretense either as an intentional activity on the speaker's part or as an intentional activity on the interlocutor's part. As I hinted at before, however, it is neither. As speaking of make-believe games clearly reveals, for the fictionalist pretense has to be equated with make-believe. Make-believe is a public, or even better intersubjective, activity, that transcends the intentions of single participants to the game, whether they are actors or spectators in it. 29 Put otherwise, make-believe is a socially shared activity. Both the actor's and the spectators' imaginative points of view are necessary (and possibly jointly sufficient) in order to make something a makebelieve activity. As with games in general, one cannot make-believe in isolation. 30 So, in the answering machine case "now" is mutually taken to refer to a time posterior to the time of the relevant utterance, for the relevant make-believe game with answering machines is shared.
31 He who understood a token of "now" left on an answering machine as referring to its utterance time would simply be as much incompetent in that kind of game as someone who took seriously an actor on stage screaming:
Fire over there! and ran off the theatre. Moreover, insofar as it is a game, make-believe is a rule-governed activity. In Walton's terms, to make-believe something is to prescribe oneself to imagine something; that is, to (publicly) follow rules for one's imagination. 32 If one imagined that "there" in an actor's screaming (12) referred to a place in the theatre, she would have had the wrong imagination. In the same vein, one is not allowed to play a make-believe game with her answering machine by imagining that the time she is referring by "now" is the time of its utterance. The rules of that game would indeed force that imagination not to constitute an authorized make-believe game with that device.
As a result of this way of seeing what make-believe is, the conventionalists' objection may be superseded. First, it may well be the case that one is pretending to be someone else even though her intention to be such is ignored, as in the case of (9). For in the present sense, pretending to be someone else does not depend on someone's intentions, but on the fact that one is playing with others a certain make-believe game. This is why in (9) "I" shifts its reference from its utterer to the office owner. Independently of her intention, the speaker is pretending to be that owner, insofar as she is recognized as so pretending by the people playing that makebelieve game along with her. Second, it may well be the case that one thinks that someone else is making believe and this thought is incorrect, as in the case of the students hearing (11). No reference shift occurs there for "I", for no make-believe is actually involved. What is involved is just the erroneous thought, on (11)'s interlocutors' part, that make-believe is there.
Furthermore, the positive side of the conventionalist stance on context shift can be retained by the fictionalist as well. As we saw before, I cannot be someone else neither at my, nor at your, will. Something that transcends both my and your perspective must be invoked; namely, a make-believe game that both of us share. Thus, in order to pretend that one is someone else, a make-believe game must be played. Now, precisely because make-believe is a public rule-governed activity, it has a conventional, if not an institutional, flavour. True enough, in make-believe there may well be no explicit stipulations; yet in order for something to count as something else (e.g., an individual as an office owner, a translator as the person whose speech is translated, an actor as a personage. . .), some rule must be in play that has conventional, if not institutional, effects.
First of all, let us see the normative point. Thinking e.g. to be Napoleon is completely irrelevant for counting as Napoleon; rules, not intentions, are at stake here. A fool walking around by attempting at assuring others that he himself is Napoleon does not count as Napoleon unless he is assumed to be Napoleon, he is taken to play Napoleon's part; better said, unless there is a prescription to imagine that he is Napoleon. The situation is analogous to that of a pièce whose actors start reciting while sitting in the audience. Their speaking in first-person make them (make-believedly) refer to the personages they are representing not because they intend to do so; if I got up by intending to play along with them and started speaking in first-person as well, that would not make me (make-believedly) refer to any personage. 33 Rather, the actors so (make-believedly) refer insofar as they are recognized as such by the audience, so that it is correct for the audience to imagine them as their personages, hence to imagine their uses of "I" as referring to such personages as well. 34 So, a context shift arises precisely when, and only when, the rules of a make-believe game are enacted.
As to the rules' institutional effects, moreover, note that one counts as someone else as long as there is a certain institutional relation between her and that someone; whenever one speaks out of the scope of such a relation, she no longer counts as that someone. For example, if struck by a sudden pain a translator shrieks:
Sorry, I've got a terrible stomach-ache she no longer counts as translating someone else's speech, even if that someone had simultaneously uttered a same-saying sentence in his own language. As a result, in the above token of (13) "I" comes back to refer to herself. Pretty much in the same way as an actor would no longer count as Othello if, while being in the same physical condition, he uttered (13) on stage. By so doing, he would have left -however temporarily -the make-believe game. Unaware of that condition, the audience would perhaps take him as still engaged in a -admittedly unusual -kind of pretense. Yet the audience would simply be mistaken, in the same way as the students were simply mistaken in thinking their teacher were playing the part of Aristotle and so referred to the philosopher in her utterance of (11). Once fictionalism is given this normative, if not institutional, twist, however, one might still think that there is no such a big difference between the fictionalist and the conventionalist perspective. To be sure, this thought seems improper to me. It is one thing to speak of conventions and quite another thing to speak of prescriptions regarding what it is right to imagine. Independently of this, however, that thought would not be correct either. For, although sometimes it may well be the case that a context shift may be indifferently explained in terms of make-believe or in terms of a certain conventional setting, some other times it is clear that appealing to make-believe, hence to the distinction between utterance contexts and fictional interpretation contexts, is the preferred explanation. Let us see the following case.
An answering machine may contain any sort of bizarre messages. One of them may well sound as follows: (14) I am not myself, but my answering machine. (Please leave a message)
In (14), the occurrence of "myself" (as well as the occurrence of the possessive "my") is not problematic: it refers to the original utterer of the sentence, as well as "I" does in (2) (or in (1) for that matters). Yet the occurrence of "I" seems troubling. For if it referred to that utterer, the first conjunct of (14) would express a necessary falsehood. Yet, as the second conjunct of (14) clearly shows, there is no such problem, for that occurrence of "I" does not refer to that original utterer, but rather to the answering machine itself ! Definitely, in order to explain such a shift one cannot appeal to conventional settings. For there definitely is no conventional setting which regards the fact that answering machines play the part of animate beings. Rather, what happens is that, as far as the occurrence of "I" is concerned, the original utterer of (14) pretends to be something else; namely, his own answering machine. So, my answering machine is the pretended agent of the utterance of that token of "I", or, which comes to the same thing, is the agent of an interpretation context different from the context of that utterance, i.e., a given fictional context which has my answering machine among its parameters precisely as the agent parameter. Very recently, Corazza has proposed another theory to deal with some at least of the above examples. According to Corazza's new theory, when pure indexicals like "here" and "now" do not refer to the referents they should have in their respective context of utterance, it is not the case that the context relevant for the semantic interpretation of the sentences containing them shifts to a different interpretation context. Rather, in such cases the relevant sentence is elliptical for a more complex sentence, typically a conjunction whose implicit first conjunct contains a term, implicit as well, to which the indexical anaphorically ties back for its own reference. So, although the implicit term does not contribute to bind the indexical (as it may happen e.g. in epistemic contexts), it forces that indexical to refer to whatever it refers to. In this sense, Corazza says that in such cases indexicals like "now" and "here" work as unbound anaphoras. Corazza starts from a sentence explicitly containing anaphorical links like:
In 1834 Jon visited his mother, the once famous actress, now an old, sick woman.
In (15), "now" does not refer to the time of its utterance, but rather to 1834, a moment of time to which it is referentially tied by its dependence precisely on the term "1834" explicitly occurring at the beginning of the sentence. While "1834" independently refers to that year, "now" dependently refers to that very year; "now" therefore works as an (unbound) anaphora. This is therefore the correct semantic representation of (15) The superscripts, "i" for "independent", "d" for dependent, indicate the anaphoric link between the two terms, while the double occurrence of the subscript "1" indicates their being co-referential. "1" also signals that the first term, the independent expression, is explicit. Now, Corazza suggests that the already considered:
Now Hitler begins his invasion of USSR has to be interpreted basically in the same way. That is, it must be seen as implicitly preceded by an antecedent sentence containing a term to which its indexical is again anaphorically linked. Given its implicitness, that term is a tacit initiator. So, (3) is equivalent to: 
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By occurring twice, the subscript "0" indicates again co-referentiality; but it also signals precisely the fact that the antecedent independent term, this time "June 22, 1941", is implicit, is a tacit initiator.
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As Corazza himself acknowledges, 39 this solution may be seen as having the same kind of drawback as Smith's "multiple characters" -theory, namely that it postulates an ambiguity in the semantic workings of indexicals like "now" (and "here"). On the one hand, in ordinary cases these terms work as pure indexicals endowed with a Kaplanian character; on the other hand, in extraordinary cases they work as unbound anaphoras. True enough, Corazza rejoinders that this ambiguity is harmless. For it is the same ambiguity that already affects third-person pronouns, in their having a mundane reference 41 Now, the existence of alternative theoretical treatments of the same phenomena, like the fictionalist account, shows that there is no necessity to postulate an ambiguity in the semantic behavior of "now" and "here", as Corazza instead does. For the fictionalist account precisely requires no such ambiguity.
Moreover, I see two further problems with the "unbound anaphora"-theory. First, by appealing to an "ellipsis"-strategy, that theory is forced to claim that sometimes indexical sentences (or better, some of their tokens) have a hidden form which differs from its surface one. For although tokens of "now" (and "here") occurring in them seem to be independent, they have rather to be taken as dependent ones. Now, economy considerations again suggest that accounts that do not complicate logical form, if they exist, are preferable to those that complicate it. Now, the fictionalist treatment of indexical sentences precisely avoids complications in logical form. Indeed, like the intentionalist treatment, it claims that an indexical sentence has always one and the same form. Simply, again like intentionalists, in appealing to a narrow notion of context -namely, a context which, once mapped to a sentence having that form, determines for that sentence a specific truth-conditional interpretation -it leaves to pragmatic factors (notably, pretense) whether the parameters of that context are the utterance parameters or nor. 42 Thus, it seems preferable to the "unbound anaphora"-theory.
Second, it is not clear which scope the "unbound anaphora"-theory possesses. As a matter of fact, the conventional account is clearly intensionally different from the anaphorical account: saying that the reference of an indexical is given anaphorically is conceptually different from saying that its reference is fixed by appealing to a previous conventional setting. Yet do these accounts differ also extensionally? why certain cases that, according to Corazza, should be dealt with in terms of the "unbound anaphora"-theory, are not to be treated in terms of the conventionalist account? Take e.g.: 
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Why does not Corazza defend the idea that it is a conventional setting that makes "here" in (18) shift its reference from the utterance place to the geographical site indicated by the map? Indeed, one might well say that in so using "here" we are relying on a convention fixing that, whenever we seem to talk of map points, we are to be meant as talking of the mapped things. In point of fact, according to Corazza the fact that there is a conventional setting fixing that post-its are to be meant as concerning institutionally-oriented items like office owners, explain why in (6) we do not mean (the implicit) "here" as referring to the dustbin rather than to the office.
To be sure, Corazza may well acknowledge that the conventionalist approach can successfully deal with the cases for which he invoked the anaphorical approach. He indeed seems to think that the "unbound anaphora"-treatment of non-ordinary occurrences of "here" and "now" is quite compatible with his (and others') previous conventionalist account of non-ordinary occurrences of "I". He might even say that the "unbound anaphora"-treatment actually relies on the conventionalist account. For in order to retrieve an implicit antecedent for a certain token of "now", or of "here", one may well appeal to a certain conventional setting.
To my mind, it is preliminarily doubtful that a conventional setting lurking in the background would always assure us the desired implicit antecedent. To remain to an example by Corazza, 44 take a spectator lost with respect to the temporal sequence of the events of the movie she is watching. Which convention would lie behind her asking: (19) Is this happening now?
that would enable us to retrieve the implicit alleged antecedent of her question "In the play, there is an imaginary time t"? Now, if this were the case, the conventionalist and the anaphoric treatment of indexical referential shifts would remain extensionally distinct. From a methodological point of view, therefore, the fictionalist account would remain preferable, for it deals with the same phenomena in an uniform way. Perhaps however my doubt is ungrounded: a convention may always be postulated if needed, even in cases like (19). Yet I do not whether this is better for Corazza. For if his two accounts are extensionally coincident, this risks to make the "unbound anaphora"-theory theoretically redundant.
For all those reasons, it finally seems to me that the "unbound anaphora"-theory of "now" (and "here"), either together with or independent of the conventionalist treatment of "I"'s non-ordinary occurrences, does not constitute a really viable alternative to the fictionalist approach to the same cases. In what follows, I will therefore indifferently talk either of a context yielding a specific truth-conditional interpretation to an indexical sentence or of a pair made by that context and that sentence as having that truth-conditional interpretation. Simply, I will urge that one such context may not be a context of utterance for that sentence. 3 For this reconstruction, cf. e.g. Predelli (1998b) . 4 cf. Kaplan (1989a, 509) . 5 According to Kaplan (1989a, 523) , something is a logical truth iff it is true in every context. 6 For this reconstruction of Smith's position, cf. Corazza (2004a, 291-295) . To be sure, Smith says that the different characters (meanings) associated to one the same indexical are the values of a constant meta-character, which is a function from uses of that indexical to precisely those characters. As Predelli (1998b, 405 , fn. 7) stresses, however, further new uses of an indexical may prompt the need for enriching its alleged meta-character in an ad hoc manner, by mapping those uses onto other ordinary characters that indexical would be forced to express. 7 Analogous considerations may be provided for cases like "Weather forecasts in Los Angeles. Here, it's quite windy", in which by "here" the broadcast speaker does not refer to the place where she is actually located -say, New York -but rather to the place she is talking about in her forecast report, i.e., Los Angeles. Again, for Predelli it is not the case that "here" has two characters, its character as a pure indexical which is mobilized in its ordinary uses and a demonstrative character -the same as that of the complex demonstrative "this location" -which it possesses in cases like the above one, as Smith would say. Rather, "here" has always the same meaning, its only Kaplanian character. Simply, as to the above sentence, its contextual truth-conditional contribution must be considered with respect to an interpretation context which is not the proper context of its utterance, but an intentional context, whose place parameter is an intended one. cf. Predelli (1988a, b) . 8 To be sure, once considerations of economy are brought into consideration, it seems that even Predelli's perspective is not immune from a non-economy charge. For although it does not multiply characters beyond necessity, it seems to multiply contexts: in their semantically relevant role, contexts of utterance are flanked by contexts of interpretation. Or, to put it alternatively, proper contexts of semantic interpretation, i.e., utterance contexts, are flanked by improper contexts of semantic interpretation, what Predelli labels interpretation contexts tout court. For this way of putting things, cf. Corazza (2004a, 301-302 ). Yet, as Claudia Bianchi made me note (in conversation), Predelli may well reply that he does not multiply contexts. Insofar as contexts are truth-conditionally relevant, contexts are always interpretation contexts; simply, sometimes interpretation contexts are not utterance contexts. A real "multiple contexts" theory is instead defended by Schlenker (2004) , according to whom one must distinguish the actual physical context of an indexical sentence, its context of utterance and its context of thought. Although all these contexts normally coincide, they may diverge in non-ordinary cases. 9 To be sure, there is another possibility to deal with the answering machine case. This is the idea from Sidelle (1991) that this case presents an example of a deferred utterance. According to Sidelle, a certain speaker counts as having uttered (2) later than she actually did, i.e., at a decoding rather than at an encoding time [to borrow Predelli's (1998a, 109) description of Sidelle's account] . This move allows the relevant sentence-context pair to contain again a context of utterance, whose parameters are the speaker, the location and the time of the deferred utterance. To be sure, that context remains improper, for the speaker of the deferred utterance is not at the place and the time of the deferred utterance. Yet precisely for this reason, the sentence-context pair in question yields again a truth, as intuitions suggest.
For Predelli, however, this account remains problematic. For, as far as certain utterances of (2) are concerned, it cannot be the case that the relevant contextual parameters are the speaker, the location and the time of the deferred utterance. Suppose my wife hears (2) at 10 p.m., when I am back home. Since the relevant context of utterance of (2) contains 10 p.m. as its time parameter, the corresponding sentence-context pair would again counterintuitively express a falsehood. In Predelli's reconstruction, Sidelle would reply that in such a case either there is no genuine utterance of (2) or its indexical expressions lack reference. Yet, Predelli notes, the first conclusion amounts to again denying that indexicals are always anchored to the context of genuine utterance, while the second is intuitively incorrect. cf. Predelli (1998a, 109-112) .
As to myself, Sidelle's solution not only seems to lack the appropriate generality (for I wonder whether it applies to other cases in which indexicals like "here" and "now" seem indeed to be affected by referential shifts, as we will immediately see), but also it leaves out cases in which who encodes "I" is irrelevant to truth-conditionally interpret that pronoun's reference. Suppose someone attaches on a colleague's door a post-it saying "I am not in (here)". Even allowing for a deferred utterance of the above sentence in such a case, the "I" in it would not refer to its encoder, but to a different people -the colleague in question. See also fn. 11 below. 10 cf. Predelli (1998a, b) . 11 Clearly, Berlusconi does not utter (4), not even in a deferred way. One might surmise that no context shift is involved here, for simply Berlusconi is the real utterer of (4); as Sidelle (1991) would put it, he is its deferred utterer. Yet its other possible drawbacks aside (see fn. 9), the "deferred utterance" -approach is here untenable. In order for Berlusconi to be taken as the deferred utterer of (4), a causal link should subsist between him and his translator. In other terms, with respect to his translator Berlusconi should behave more or less in the same way as in a genuine "possession" case -if there were any -a spirit behaves with respect to the medium spreading her thoughts in a spiritualistic seance. Yet in the Berlusconi case no such causal link subsists. For the relation between Berlusconi and his translator is an institutional one: within (and only in the scope of) a certain institutional frame, the translator speaks on Berlusconi's behalf. 12 One might think that, in being uttered while translating, (5) is not asserted. To my mind, this idea is disputable: in general, why a sentence that translates another should not be taken as asserted as well as the original sentence? Simply, its assertor would not be its very utterer. Yet even if that idea were correct, this would not affect the fact that a context shift is happening. For one such shift may well take place even in non-assertive discourse of any kind; for instance, in interrogative discourse. Let me borrow another example from Corazza (2004a, 292) . Suppose a spectator watches a movie so full of flashbacks that she no longer keeps track of the temporal sequence of the narrated events. In that case, she may well wonder "Is this happening now?" in order to ask whether a certain event is happening at the time the movie represents as the present and not whether that event is happening at the time of her utterance. So, to get the real content of that question, one has to appeal to a shifted context of interpretation, not to the context of the utterance. (Regarding this example, note that one does not have to take that question as a question "from within" a fiction, for it is not essential that the movie narrates an imaginary story; the story may well be a real one. If this were the case, "now" in the above question would refer to a historical present.) 13 Predelli (2002, 314-315) rebuts the further charge of humptydumptism Corazza et al. (2002) raise against him. He says that his intentionalist view is compatible with often taking the involved indexicals as referring to yet as not used to refer to the individuals constituting the parameters of the intended context. Yet I am more radical than Predelli in holding, along with Predelli's critics, that intentions do not establish indexical reference, for something less subjective is required to that purpose: namely, pretense in the sense of a make-believe practice (see later). 14 See Corazza et al. (2002, 8-9) and Corazza (2004b) for similar remarks. 15 In this respect, pretending in the sense of making believe in a game does not even rely on the player's intentions to do so, as we will later see in detail. 16 Note again how, insofar as she makes believe pretty much as an actor does, a translator is unlike a medium on a spiritualistic seance. Someone would be an actor insofar as she played a make-believe game in which she pretended to be a certain spirit. So, if the actor said "I" in that pretense, it would be by context shift that that token of "I" would refer to the spirit and not to the actor. Yet a medium -if she really is a medium -does not pretend to be a spirit; simply, she acts as a mundane output for the spirit's voice. So, if an "I" came out of the medium's voice, it would refer to the spirit not because a context shift would be involved, but because the spirit would be the real utterer of that token of "I" -pretty much in the same way as, when an "I" comes out of an answering machine, it normally refers to its real, original utterer. 17 Of course, this is not the only possible make-believe game that as regards an answering machine one can play with time. Quite on the contrary, normally in such games the pretended time to which "now" refers is the time, whatever it is, at which the hearer, whoever she is, hears the message. In the example of (2), the possibility of referring to this indefinite elapse of time is blocked by the fact that the speaker also indicates a definite time posterior to the moment he is referring to: "Meet me in two hours (from now) at the cafeteria." 18 Analogously with the example of "Weather forecasts in Los Angeles. Here, it's quite windy" recalled in fn. 7. In uttering that sentence, the broadcast speaker is playing a make-believe game in which she is pretending not to be where she actually is, i.e., New York, but rather in another place, i.e., Los Angeles. In addressing her audience, it is as if she were saying: "let us make believe that I am in Los Angeles (rather than in New York)". Thus, Los Angeles is the pretended place of the above utterance, or, which comes to the same thing, is the place of a context different from the context of that utterance, i.e., a given fictional context which has Los Angeles among its parameters precisely as the place parameter. 19 Or the place: cf. previous footnote. 20 As Predelli himself writes for analogous cases involving "I", the speaker pretends to be in someone else 's shoes. cf. (1998b, 408) . Incidentally, appeal to make-believe shows that there is no need to multiply contexts to deal with free indirect speech -as in (7) -and historical present -as in (3) -as Schlenker (2004) instead does. Schlenker maintains that free indirect speech involves an identity between the actual physical context and what he calls the context of utterance and a disidentity of that only context from what he calls the context of thought (cf. fn. 8), while historical present requires an identity between the actual physical context and the context of thought and a disidentity of that only context from what he calls the context of utterance. Yet this three-fold distinction between kinds of context is not required if one shows that both in free indirect speech and in historical present the same make-believe mechanism is at play. The only shift that there is the one from an actual context of utterance to a fictional context of interpretation. 21 cf. e.g. Recanati (2000) , Bonomi (2006) . 22 Predelli (1998b, 407-408 ) presents a similar case involving the adjective "actual". 23 We can accordingly reformulate things as far as the evaluation of sentencecontext pairs is concerned: while the pair made by (8)'s de-indexicalization and a fictional context whose world parameter is shifted to an imaginary world is true iff in that world Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls, the pair made by (2) and a fictional context whose time parameter is shifted is true iff in the real world the husband is not home at the shifted time, i.e. 5 p.m. (of the relevant day). 24 Thus, on the one hand the phenomenon affecting a sentence e.g. like (4) is the same as that affecting a sentence paradigmatically involving fiction, as Proust's In Search of Time Lost's incipit: "For a long time, I would go to bed early". Like (4), that incipit has to be interpreted in a fictional context whose agent parameter is not its utterer (or better, its producer, i.e., Marcel Proust), but a different individual (the imaginary individual narrating In Search of Time Lost from the first-person perspective). Yet on the other hand, the only difference between (4) and Proust's incipit is that (4) is to be evaluated with respect to the real world, whereas the incipit has to be evaluated with respect to an imaginary world. For (4) is really true, i.e., true in a fictional context whose agent parameter is shifted, iff in the world of that fictional context, i.e., the real world, Berlusconi is such that he would recruit Schutz as a kapò in one of his tv serials; whereas Proust's incipit is fictionally true, i.e., true in a fictional context in which not only the agent, but also the world parameter is shifted to an imaginary item, iff in the world of that fictional context, i.e., the imaginary world of Proust's narration, the imaginary narrator would go to bed early for a long time. 25 See also Corazza (2004b) . 26 cf. Corazza et al. (2002, 9, 15) . 27 cf. Corazza et al. (2002, 9) . 28 cf. Corazza et al. (2002, 13 fn.12 ). 29 cf. Walton (1990, 39-41) . 30 Or, to put it better, in order for someone to play a make-believe game alone (as when a child serves tea to her stuffed animals), she must have already played other make-believe games with others. For this ensures that, even though it turned out that nobody actually grasps what she is doing, she might have been understood. Otherwise, that make-believe game would count as an impossible private game, i.e., a game that can be played by that player alone. cf. Wittgenstein (1953, § 204) . In a nutshell, qua game make-believe is a rule-governed activity and, as we precisely know from Wittgenstein, there is no private rule-following, in the sense that nobody can follow a rule that no-one else can follow. See immediately below. 31 Or shareable: cf. previous footnote. 32 cf. Walton (1990, 39-42) . 33 This explains why in Romdenh-Romuluc's (2002) example, "Now the French are invading England!" the person uttering that sentence does not refer by "now" to 1066, the time of the Norman conquest of England, but to the time of her utterance. For although she intends to be an actor in a pièce on the Norman conquest of England, in the example's situation there is no such pièce; simply, she erroneously believes there is one. While commenting this case, Predelli (2002, 312) insists that "now" would there refer to 1066. Yet Predelli slightly changes the example, by imagining someone mumbling within herself "Now England is being invaded". In this latter case, it may well be the case that by "now" the utterer refers to 1066 rather than to the time of her (mental) utterance. For we have here a situation of solitary imaginative activity that can really count as a make-believe practice provided that it is dependent on socially shared practices of the same kind. cf. on this fn. 30. 34 Given this situation, it is appropriate to say that there is no conventional setting fixing an indexical's shifted reference; no explicit convention states, for instance, that the pièce has begun. Yet the very same situation shows that that reference fixing does not depend on the fact that intentions override conventions, as Predelli (2002, 313-314) would be prompted to react. If I write (6) twice, first on my door and then on my colleague's door, "I" shifts reference from the first to the second inscription for only in the second case a certain make-believe game is played. 35 The case of (14) is made more complicated by the fact that, to put it more precisely, the context yielding (14) specific truth-conditions results from the union of two subsentential contexts, an utterance context involving the speaker as its agent parameter and fixing the reference of the occurrence of "myself" (and of the occurrence of "my") accordingly, and a fictional context involving the answering machine as its agent parameter and fixing the reference of the occurrence of "I" accordingly. Thus, we may say that there is a context shift occurring in (14)'s first midsentence. As Braun (1996) has shown for a similar case involving different tokens of one and the same demonstrative having different referents, "that is bigger than that", a theory allowing for midsentence context shift is simply a liberalized Kaplan-like theory of indexicals. For the two referentially distinct occurrences of one and the same indexical (more precisely, the occurrences of "I" and "myself", in the case of (14)) share the same character. As both Recanati (2000, 229-230) and Schlenker (2004) have noted, other similar shifts may occur both in sentences involving free indirect speech (in the example (7) above, "me" refers to the speaker of the utterance context, yet "tomorrow" refer to the day following the day of the fictional context) as well as in sentences involving historical present (if (3) were prefixed by a phrase like "Sixty three years ago", "ago" would refer to a time occurring sixty three years before the time of (3)'s utterance; yet "now" (or the tense of "begins" for that matters) would still refer to the time of the fictional context). 36 I follow Corazza's policy of writing in italics the anaphorically dependent term. 37 I follow Corazza's policy of writing in bold the (sometimes implicit) independent term to which other terms are anaphorically linked. 38 An analysis similar to that of (15) would be moreover provided by Corazza for "Weather forecasts in Los Angeles. Here, it's quite windy" (cf. fn. 7), namely "Weather forecasts in Los Angeles i 1 . Here d 1 , it's quite windy". cf. Corazza (2004a, 304) . 39 cf. Corazza (2004a, 302) . 40 ib. 41 cf. Grice (1989, 47-50) . 42 To be sure, in ordinary cases the narrow context is proper while in nonordinary cases it is not, for at least some of its parameters are not utterance parameters. Yet this parametrical choice depends on pre-semantic facts (or, which is the same, on a pre-semantic appeal to a wide notion of context, containing various facts of the world as well as mental states of the interlocutors), such as the fact that the relevant sentence is uttered in a make-believe game. For the distinction between narrow and wide context as well as to the idea that wide context can be appealed to pre-semantically, cf. Perry (1997) . 44 Already quoted in fn. 12. cf. Corazza (2004a, 292, 303) . 45 Preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at the 4th Prague Interpretation Colloquium, April 2004 and at the SIFA 6th National Conference, Genoa, October 2004. I thank all the participants to that meeting for their stimulating questions. I am moreover very grateful to Eros Corazza, Andrea Iacona, and Stefano Predelli, as well as to two anonymous referees of this Journal, for their insightful comments.
